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Social research, from economics to demography and epidemiology, makes extensive
use of statistical models in order to establish causal relations. The question arises as to
what guarantees the causal interpretation of such models. In this paper we focus on
econometrics and advance the view that causal models are ‘augmented’ statistical
models that incorporate important causal information which contributes to their causal
interpretation. The primary objective of this paper is to argue that causal claims are
established on the basis of a plurality of evidence. We discuss the consequences of
‘evidential pluralism’ in the context of econometric modelling.
Keywords: statistical model; causal model; evidential pluralism; causality; role of
evidence
1. Introduction
Statistical models are widely used in quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences.
A panoply of disciplines make use of them – from econometrics to sociology, from
epidemiology to experimental psychology. ‘Causal modelling’, as it is also customarily
called, has a long tradition tracing back to Quetelet (1869) and Durkheim [1897] (1960) who,
in the nineteenth century, set the ground for a quantitative and scientific study of societal
problems. Major improvements in quantitative causal analysis are also due to Wright (1921)
andHaavelmo (1944) in the first half of the twentieth century andBlalock (1961) andDuncan
(1975) in the secondhalf of the twentieth century. In very recent noteworthyprogress has been
made by Pearl (2000) (and collaborators), Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000) and
econometricians in the schools of Heckman (2008) and Hoover (2001), for example.
What distinguishes early methodologists from present-day ones (with a notable
exception, perhaps, for Pearl (2000), Spirtes et al. (2000)) is that they were explicit in
adopting a causal interpretation of the statistical models they developed. For instance,
Wright had no doubt that his ‘path coefficients’ were measures of causal strength between
two variables. Today’s methodologists and practising scientists, on the contrary, are much
more cautious in adopting a causal stance. This is, partly and possibly, because today’s
statistical models are much more complex, and also because it is certainly a very difficult
task to establish stable causal relations in the unstable social world.
Although the caution (and sometimes scepticism) towards an overt causalist stance is
understandable, the question remains as to what allows one to interpret, under
circumstances to be specified, a statistical model in causal terms, no matter how complex it
is. We address exactly this issue.
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The paper draws on examples from causal modelling in econometrics and is organised as
follows. In Section 2 we present statistical models used to infer associations and causal
relations. We compare ‘associational’ and ‘causal’ models pointing at differences at three
different levels: (1) background knowledge, (2) assumptions and (3) methodology. The
presentation in this section draws upon the distinction between associational models and
causalmodels, borrowed fromRusso (2009a, 2009b), on the one hand, and between statistical
and causal information, borrowed from Moneta (2007), on the other hand. In Section 3 we
focus more specifically on the distinction between statistical and causal information, which is
also akin to statistical versus substantive information (Spanos, 2006) and statistical versus
theory information (Spanos, 1999). We argue that statistical models can be causally
interpreted to the extent that statistical and causal information are carefully distinguished and
their role assessed within associational and causal models, respectively. The idea of carefully
distinguishing statistical and causalmodelswas already discussed in Spanos (2005, 2010) and
Hoover (2009), although in quite different terms (cf. also Hoover, Johansen, & Juselius,
2008). Our account introduces the notion of associational model and the idea of causal model
as its augmentation. We argue that this augmentation is supported by a plurality of evidence.
In Section 4we discuss at length this thesis, whichwe refer to as ‘evidential pluralism’, and its
consequences for econometric modelling. Throughout the paper, we highlight how evidence
of mechanisms enters the stage of associational model and of causal model.
2. Associational models versus causal models
Scientists and philosophers alike will promptly agree on a broad distinction between
associational models, on the one hand, and causal models, on the other hand. Here, we take
‘associational models’ as a handy short cut for ‘statistical models in which associations
among random variables are analysed’, and ‘causal models’ as a handy short cut for
‘augmented statistical models in which some of the associations can be interpreted as
causal relations’. First, we clarify the distinction between associational and causal models,
and then we present them in turn, focusing on three specific aspects: background
knowledge, assumptions and methodology.
2.1 The distinction
Simply put, the claims made on the basis of an associational model refer to some properties
or specifications of the probability distribution (joint or conditional) of the randomvariables
that are studied. Causal models make a step further as they aim at uncovering causal
relations. It is worth noting that associational models go beyond the so-called ‘descriptive’
statistics and make use of ‘inferential statistics’ as well: they aim to establish whether the
data are a representative sample of a theoretical distribution (or data generating process
[DGP]) and make inferences about the properties of this distribution from the data.
Notwithstanding the large agreement on this issue, more needs to be said. What is at
stake is in fact to specify the features of associational models and of causal models in order
to understand how causal models, under certain conditions, can use the information
provided by associational models, such as measures of statistical dependence
(e.g. regression coefficients or partial correlations), to support causal claims. We will
also address this issue in Section 4 when discussing the evidence that supports causal
claims. Notably, we will discuss how evidence of difference-making and evidence of
mechanisms enter the two stages (associational and causal model) and support their
respective inferences (about dependencies and about causal relations).
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In this section, we present, in order, associational models and causal models, pointing
at differences at three levels: (1) background knowledge, (2) assumptions and (3)
methodology. The difference between associational and causal models can be
schematically represented as in Table 1.
2.2 Associational models
Associational models aim to provide an accurate and reliable description of how certain
phenomena (chance events) are regularly associated among each other in their occurrence.
Since the occurrence of chance events is quantitatively analysed through the lenses of the
probabilistic structure of random variables, from an adequately specified associational
model one can get a description of how the variations within the realisations of a random
variable are (regularly) associated with the variations within the realisations of other
random variables.1
In associational models, we start by analysing the data and infer a probabilistic
structure underlying the observations. It is in this probabilistic structure that statistical
dependencies between variables of interest, which are potentially meaningful, can be
identified. Establishing statistical dependencies corresponds to what we will call in
Section 4 ‘evidence of difference-making’. The causal interpretation is provided at a
further stage of analysis (see discussion of causal models below), and the ‘augmentation’
also includes evidence of mechanisms, in a way that we discuss in Section 4. Moreover,
dependencies are potentially meaningful, i.e. not irrelevant, only if the underlying
statistically model is adequately specified. In the common statistical parlance, a measured
probabilistic dependence between two variables in which there is no direct causal path
connecting them is called spurious. This may due either to a third variable causing both of
them (cf. common cause principle) or due to the mere fact that the probabilistic
dependence stems from a mis-specified statistical model, which relies, for instance, on a
too small data-set or on assumptions not adequately corroborated, so that the measured
dependence is not a property of the underlying chance set-up (more on this below). It is
important, however, to carefully distinguish between these two cases. In the case of
misspecification, the alleged association would be irrelevant, whereas in the case of a
common cause the statistical dependence would be ‘spurious’ but not irrelevant, since it
delivers useful information. We argue that in an adequately specified statistical model, all
the correctly identified statistical dependencies are relevant. Whether a statistical model is
adequately specified is an empirical issue to be addressed with misspecification testing vis-
a`-vis the data, as suggested by Spanos (1999).
Associational models are formalised under the language of statistics so that
associational models reduce to statistical models. Associational or statistical models, as
Table 1. Associational models versus causal models.
Associational models Causal models
Background
knowledge
Choice of variables Causal context; theoretical knowledge;
institutional knowledge, etc.
Assumptions Statistical Statistical; extra-statistical; causal
Methodology Model-based statistical induction
and hypothetico-deductive
method
Model-based induction and
hypothetico-deductive method
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summarised in Table 1, are based on some background knowledge, assumptions (which
includes model specifications) and methodology.
2.2.1 Background knowledge
Extra-statistical substantive knowledge plays a minor role in building an associational
model. Since an associational model is built with the aim of bringing about evidence for
theoretical questions, such questions influence the choice of the data of interest and the
focus on particular dependence relations. However, once we choose the data and specify
the focus of the model, background ‘extra-statistical’ knowledge does not play a crucial
role any longer. This does not mean, of course, that in building an associational model the
researcher needs to disregard any contextual (extra-statistical) knowledge. In fact,
background knowledge may suggest, for example, that some macroeconomic data are
likely to be difference-stationary or other consumption data regarding demographically
different households non-homogeneous. These may actually be useful pieces of
information. The point is that, in all these cases, the specifications of the associational
model are based on the data via statistical tests.
2.2.2 Assumptions and specifications
Associational models are specified statistical models in which it is possible to analyse and
estimate various measures and forms of statistical dependence. A (not yet specified)
statistical model is a family of distribution functions describing a chance set-up (see Spanos,
1999). The most general way of describing a DGP (or chance set-up) is to say that each
single observation is the realisation of a single random variable, where the relationships
among the random variables are left open. The probability according to which a particular
random variable assumes a certain value or a certain interval of values is determined by the
probability distribution. Adopting the terminology of Spanos (2012), a particular data-set
Z0 ¼ fzik; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; k ¼ 1; . . . ; p} ð1Þ
is viewed as the realisation of a set of random variables, i.e. of a sample
Z ¼ fZik; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; k ¼ 1; . . . ; p}. The statistical model determines the probabilistic
structure of the sample. In its general form the statistical model can be written as:
MuðzÞ ¼ ff ðz; uÞ; u [ Q} z [ RnpZ ; for u [ Q , Rm; m , np ð2Þ
where f ðz; uÞ denotes the joint distribution of the sample Z (cf. Spanos, 2011, 2012). This
statistical model is so general that this is uninformative. Equation (2) just says that the data
are generated by a chance set-up of which we do not know anything at all. Statistical
inference precisely aims at obtaining a specified statistical model that formalises the chance
set-up underlying the observed phenomena. Notice that, as Hacking (1965) has pointed out,
the chance set-up can be merely hypothetical. What matters is that the phenomena display
‘chance regularities patterns’ (Spanos, 1999) such that the corresponding data can be
described as generated by a chance set-up.
From a specified statistical model we can obtain useful statistical information for
causal inference. The description of the chance set-up provided by a specified
statistical model is much more informative than the description provided by the
general statistical model. In fact, the specified statistical model partially opens the
black box and provides some details about the chance set-up, while the general
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statistical model just says that the data is generated by some chance set-up. The
details of the chance set-up turn out to be useful to understand whether (and to what
extent) variables are associated.
An important formulation of the statistical model in a manner which facilitates the
further (data-based) specification and (causal knowledge-based) augmentation is obtained
through the so-called ‘marginal-conditional decomposition’ (Mouchart & Russo, 2011).
For example, let the data Z0 in Equation (1) correspond to zik ¼ ðxi; yi;wiÞ for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n
(k ¼ 3). The marginal-conditional decomposition amounts to consider the set of random
variables ðXi; Yi;WiÞ that have generated ðxi; yi;wiÞ for each i, to choose a set of
conditioning variables (for example Xi and Wi) and to factorise the joint probability
density function of ðXi; Yi;WiÞ in the following way:
f ðXi; Yi;Wi; uiÞ ¼ f ðXi;Wi; uiÞf ðYijXi;Wi; uiÞ; for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n and ui [ Q: ð3Þ
Needless to say, one can envisage alternative formulations by choosing alternative
conditioning sets. Moreover, the (unconditional) joint density function on the right hand
side of Equation (3) can be further decomposed into: f ðXijWi; uiÞf ðWi; uiÞ.
Assuming that EðjY2i jÞ , 1, it is also possible to write:
Yi ¼ EðYijXi ¼ xi;Wi ¼ wiÞ þ ui; for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n ð4Þ
This is called by Spanos (1999, p. 370) a statistical generating mechanism, where
EðYijXi ¼ xi;Wi ¼ wiÞ is the systematic component and the term ui is the non-
systematic component, which is indeed obtained by subtracting the systematic
component from Yi.
The statistical model is further specified using statistical testing, which uses
exclusively data and probability theory. For instance, suppose that after the appropriate
testing, the random variables ðY1; . . . ;YnÞ turn out to be independent and identically
distributed, and the same assumption can be made as regards both ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ and
ðW1; . . . ;WnÞ. Furthermore, suppose that the probability density function f ðX; Y ;WÞ turns
out to be normal.2 In this case the statistical model (generating mechanism, in Spanos’
terminology) reduces to the linear regression model:
Y ¼ aþ bxþ gwþ 1: ð5Þ
Background or causal knowledge can suggest further restrictions of this statistical
model, which should not be in contrast with the testable specifications. For instance,
substantive information may suggest that bþ g ¼ 1 and it is possible to test this
restriction through a standard F test.3 If the restriction is consistent with the data, the
statistical model (5) is reparametrised in Y ¼ aþ bxþ ð12 bÞwþ 1.
If the underlying distribution function is normal, we could use the partial correlation
rðX; YjWÞ to measure the conditional dependence of X and Y given W. In particular, it
turns out that, under the normality assumption, rðX; YjWÞ ¼ 0, if and only if X and Y are
independent given W (X YjW).4
If the statistical model is adequately specified, it accurately describes how variables
co-vary. It is worth noting that the dependencies in the associational model are, to a certain
extent, symmetric. This means that one may think of modelling x ¼ EðXjY ¼ y;W ¼
wÞ þ v instead of Equation (4) and obtain significant (although different) coefficient
estimates. It will be the task of the causal modeller to add further constraints, typically
coming from background knowledge, in order to attain the asymmetries sought for a
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causal interpretation. As we shall see in the next section, the causal model will augment
the associational model with a new viewpoint, which conceives of Equation (4) as
stochastic mechanisms that generate y given x, w and u, provided that this direction of
causal influence is compatible with background knowledge and other model assumptions.
As mentioned above, alternative formulations of the statistical model are possible by
choosing different (even opposite) conditioning sets.
2.2.3 Methodology
We have seen that in associational models we draw conclusions about statistical
dependencies between variables from data. The ‘machinery’ of associational models helps
establish that difference-making relations between variables hold (see Section 4). At a first
sight, this is a pure inductive methodology: it uses a specific set of data to derive
conclusions about the general stochastic process that generated the data. The inference is
indeed inductive because it is both ampliative and not necessarily truth-preserving
(it cannot be excluded that the conclusions inferred may be mistaken). These statistical
dependencies are usually inferred from data within a hypothetico-deductive framework:
we formulate hypotheses about the DGP and derive the consequences to be confronted
with the data. The nature of these hypotheses is mainly statistical, while we will see that in
causal models they have a more prominent causal import.
2.2.4 Example
Let us consider now a stylised econometric example of an associational model.
Suppose we are interested in studying the relationship between expenditures on some
good or service and income, and we have data sampled from a population of
households (for example British households). Theoretical knowledge is crucial for the
choice of variables and data, and particularly the choice of the level of aggregation of
expenditures. The researcher can focus on categories of goods such as food, clothing
and housing, or on more disaggregated items such as cereal products, milk, eggs, fat
and milk. The choice of the level of aggregation usually depends on the research
question one is interested in.
Available data (e.g. from the Family Expenditure Survey in UK) are usually based on
survey of families, selected as a representative sample from a population (e.g. the population
of British families), which is approximately considered as an infinite population. In this way
the variations occurring in the underlying population can be formalised by a probability
density function f ðX; Y ; uÞ, where Y denotes expenditure on some good and service,
X denotes income and u is a set of parameters. Such a statistical model presupposes already a
specification, namely that the random variables X1; . . . ;Xn generating the household
income data are independent and identically distributed, and the same can be said for the
random variables Y1; . . . ; Yn generating the household expenditure data.
In view of a causal analysis, the study of the regression model provides an important
and useful specification of the statistical model:
mðxÞ ¼ EðYjX ¼ xÞ ¼
ðþ1
21
yf ðYjXÞdy: ð6Þ
This regression function (conditional expectation) mðxÞ can be specified and then
estimated in a parametric way or alternatively directly estimated via a nonparametric
method. For the sake of the estimation of this regression function, in the income–
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expenditure setting referred to as Engel curve, it is not necessary to specify the functional
form of the joint density f ðX;Y ; uÞ, although the marginal density function f ðXÞ in many
empirical cases is significantly close to a log normal distribution. Examples of parametric
specifications of Engel curves are:
Y ¼ log xþ 1; Y ¼ x log xþ 1; log Y ¼ log xþ 1; Y ¼ x2 þ 1 ð7Þ
In the nonparametric approach we can write:
Y ¼ mðxÞ þ 1 ð8Þ
where the function mðxÞ is not specified a priori. In this case one finds, directly from the
data, a set of points (whose connection constitutes a smooth line) which better fits
the regression function. A common approach in empirical economics is to evaluate the
adequacy of the parametric and nonparametric estimates of Engel curve by looking at
measures of goodness of fit based on the smallness of the residuals. However, as Spanos
(2007) points out, the adequacy of a statistical specification should not be based on
goodness-of-fit measures, but rather on a criterion which is able to assess whether the
specified statistical model accounts for the regularities in the data better than the
alternative specifications. In the framework proposed by Spanos, which is in our view
largely compatible with ours, an adequate specification of the model should be based on a
test which is able to check whether the residuals are non-systematic enough (e.g. white
noise). This test is empirical (based on observed data), once it is formulated in terms of a
set of probabilistic assumptions about the DGP.
Notice that, in order to specify the regression function, extra-statistical background
knowledge does play a role, but only at the beginning. Theoretical knowledge influences
the choice of the data of interest and the expenditures Y on which the regression function
curve is defined. But once the set of data ðX; YÞ is chosen, the estimation of the regression
function curve is based only on statistical assumptions. These assumptions concern, in this
specific case, the chosen functional form (in the parametric approach) and the method of
estimation. The methodology is hypothetico-deductive, in the sense defined above:
hypotheses about the functional form and distribution, which may, of course, be derived
from background knowledge, are formalised and confronted with the data. The chosen
‘direction’ of the regression function (i.e. the estimation of EðYjX ¼ xÞ instead of EðXjY ¼
yÞÞ depends on the causal model we eventually want to analyse. Indeed, only if the
underlying causal influence runs from X to Y and not from Y to X, the coefficient estimates
of mðxÞ will make substantive sense. But these considerations enter only in the
specification of the corresponding causal model (see the next section).
2.3 Causal models
To go beyond claims about associations and statistical dependencies we need (1) more
background (extra-statistical) knowledge of the causal context, (2) further assumptions
and (3) a methodology to confirm/disconfirm causal hypotheses. These features will be
here sketched and discussed more thoroughly in Section 3, where we will pay special
attention to the ‘extra-statistical’ assumptions made in causal models.
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2.3.1 Background knowledge
Background knowledge used in causal models includes general knowledge of the socio-
political context and of the demographic characteristics of the population under analysis. It
also includes economic theory or ‘institutional knowledge’ such as, for example, the
functioning and procedures of a central bank. In disciplines at the border between the
social and the biomedical, such as epidemiology, background knowledge also includes
information about the physical-biological-physiological mechanisms. In Section 4 we will
develop further this point, namely how evidence of mechanisms supports inferences about
causal relations and how this is related to evidence of difference-making, established in the
form of dependencies in associational models.
2.3.2 Assumptions
Causal models have the same ‘statistical’ assumptions described above for associational
models. But, in addition, they also have ‘extra-statistical’ assumptions. We can classify
under ‘extra-statistical’ assumptions all assumptions that are not related to the statistical
properties of the distribution and that have causal meaning or that impose restrictions on
the distribution but are not subject to statistical testing. For instance, the direction of time
or the direction of the causal relation belong to this class. The causal Markov condition in
the graphical models literature (Spirtes et al., 2000) is an example of an assumption
imposing restrictions on the probability density function but not subject to direct statistical
testing. There could be other assumptions, which are instead subject to statistical test and
which can directly contribute to interpreting the relations between the variables in the
model causally. Causal assumptions will be more thoroughly discussed in Section 3.
2.3.3 Methodology
In causal models a common way to draw causal conclusions is to put in place a
hypothetico-deductive methodology. In very simple terms, we first formulate hypotheses
out of background knowledge and of preliminary analyses of data and then we test them to
ascertain whether and to what extent the consequences derived from such hypotheses hold.
The possible causal structures, in order to bridge the gap with statistical models, are
typically formulated as structural models, which are systems of equations which can be
easily confronted with the system of equation obtained from the specified statistical model.
The so-called identification problem (cf. Dufour & Hsiao, 2008) studies the conditions
under which this confrontation is possible. If there are more estimated statistical
parameters than unknown structural parameters, the system is under-identified; in the
opposite case (more statistical than structural parameters), the system is over-identified. If
the number of unknowns is equal to the number of knowns, the system is just-identified.
Since only over-identified systems are statistical testable, it is typical that the researcher
imposes zero restrictions on the parameters in order to get testable hypotheses.
A way to get over-identifying restrictions is through the graphical-model procedure
proposed by Spirtes et al. (2000) and Pearl (2000). To be correctly performed, our
perspective suggests that this procedure should be based on an adequately specified
statistical model. The first step of this method, aimed at testing conditional independence
relations, is consistent with the statistical-model methodology described above. In the
second step, under certain conditions or rules of inference such as the causal Markov
condition and the faithfulness condition, a causal graph representing the possible causal
structures is derived from the conditional independence tests.
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2.3.4 Example
Let us consider again the econometric example introduced in Section 2.2. Under what
conditions can regression functions such as Engel curves be used to run counterfactual
experiments? Suppose one is interested in evaluating the effect of a tax reform, which will
affect household income and, indirectly, household expenditure patterns. Engel curves, as
regression functions, are framed in associational models and therefore do not necessarily
remain stable under changes of income, and may even change over time. When Engel
curves are formalised in the framework of a causal model, then they can be used to
evaluate policy intervention. This means that Engel curves are augmented with theoretical
knowledge on consumption behaviour (extra-statistical assumptions). In Section 4 we
characterise such theoretical knowledge as evidence of mechanisms; in the discussion of
Engel curves, we show how information concerning socio-economic mechanisms justifies
augmenting the associational model to a causal model.
A common approach is to formulate a ‘demand system’, namely a system of equations
which explicitly formalises the effect of income and price on consumption (Banks,
Blundell, & Lewbel, 1997; Deaton, 1986). These equations are based on theoretical
assumptions about consumer behaviour, and the typical assumption in mainstream
economics is that individuals maximise their utility function. In this manner the system is
meant to remain stable under interventions that yield changes in income and prices. Since
there are alternative specifications of the demand system (in terms, for example, of the
different functional forms that describe the dependence of expenditure on income and
prices), it is important to choose the one that better matches the consumption patterns, as
they emerge in the study of the statistical Engel curves. The methodology is therefore
hypothetico-deductive: one first formulates hypotheses out of economic theory (rational
choice theory in mainstream economics) and then confronts them with the data.
It seems quite clear from the presentation above that associational models and causal
models cannot reach the same goals because they have different apparati. We want to
suggest that causal models could be thought of as augmented associational models,
augmented exactly in some particular assumptions, in the amount of background
knowledge used and in the model-building and model-testing methodology. These extra
features are the extra tools that make causal inference possible in causal models but not in
associational models. In the next section we examine in more details the import of
statistical and causal information in this augmentation from associational to causal
models.
3. Statistical and causal information
In this section we elaborate more on the meaning and import of statistical and causal
information in associational and causal models. We will argue that while associational
models only convey statistical information, causal models also convey causal information.
We will specifically address two questions. What is the difference between statistical and
causal information? And mostly, does ‘causal information’ introduce a vicious circle?
3.1 Statistical information
Statistical information, according to an established tradition, is a summary of data, or as
Fisher (1922, p. 311) put it, a ‘reduction of data’:
A quantity of data, which usually by its mere bulk is incapable of entering the mind, is to be
replaced by relatively few quantities which shall adequately represent the whole, or which, in
A. Moneta and F. Russo62
other words, shall contain as much as possible, ideally the whole, of the relevant information
contained in the original data.
This reduction is accomplished by constructing a model which formalises the
(hypothetical) population or process from which the observed data are generated. This
latter feature is what makes the collection of statistical information a procedure governed
by inferential statistics, as distinguished from descriptive statistics. While descriptive
statistics limits its analysis to the sampled data, inferential statistics goes beyond the
sample and seeks to reach conclusions about the whole population. Thus, collecting
statistical information, and in particular statistical information which is useful for causal
inference, amounts to obtaining information about some features of the process which has
generated the data and not just about the ‘superficial’ aspects of the data. Later in Section 4
we will advance the view that statistical information corresponds to what the recent
literature on evidential pluralism has called ‘evidence of difference-making’.
In this way, statistical information delivers an adequate and parsimonious description
of phenomena. It is important to ask what kinds of phenomena, since not all the
phenomena are object of statistical analysis. Statistical information is about phenomena
which exhibit ‘chance regularity patterns’ (Spanos, 1999).5 These are phenomena whose
singular occurrence is uncertain, i.e. we do not know which particular value a variable is
going to take, and, at the same time, phenomena whose aggregate occurrence has some
order, i.e. we know that among many events a certain range of values will regularly come
out.6
There is a particular piece of statistical information which is especially useful for
causal inference. This is the notion of statistical dependence. Statistical dependence
establishes that some events are frequently associated in their occurrence. Note that the
definition of statistical dependence (and independence) merely involves the notion of
density function:
X and Y are dependent iff f XY ðx; yÞ – f XðxÞf Y ðyÞ: ð9Þ
Conversely, using the symbol of statistical independence :
X Y iff f XY ðx; yÞ ¼ f XðxÞf Y ðyÞ: ð10Þ
An important related notion is that of conditional independence. Conditional
independence involves the notion of conditional density function and is used as input for
many causal search algorithms (cf. Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 2000):
X YjW iff f XYjW ðx; yjwÞ ¼ f XjW ðxjwÞf YjW ðyjwÞ ð11Þ
It is important to emphasise that the notions of statistical dependence, independence
and conditional independence are formalised within the framework of the statistical
model: they are indeed characteristics of the chance set-up and only indirectly of the data.
The data are interpreted through the lenses of the statistical model, which has the capacity
of generating data. The observed data are indeed seen as a typical realisation of the
statistical model. Thus, when we adequately identify a statistical-dependence relation, we
have captured an important aspect of the chance set-up (two variables are regularly
associated) and, therefore, of the phenomena of interest, which are realisations of this set-
up. The model is specified in terms of probability density functions and then further
specified in terms of a system of stochastic equations. Since dependence and the related
notions involve only probability densities, it is apparent that they are first properties of the
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model and then, if the model accurately describes the process generating the data, also of
the data. We will come back to this idea of ‘model-dependence’ later in Section 4, but it is
worth saying at this point that model-dependence is not a consequence of an anti-realist
position. As Hoover (2009) also says:
Without the models, there are no probabilities to discuss. This is not an anti-realist thesis.
To put it in another way, if we take any data and mechanically calculate correlations,
without thinking of the underlying chance set-up, it is very likely that we are led astray.
Consider a stock example discussed in the philosophical literature (Sober, 2001): if we
calculate the correlation between sea levels in Venice and British bread prices and we do
not pay attention to the characteristics of the underlying random variables and respective
probability distributions, we may think to have identified statistical dependencies, but
actually, in our perspective, we have just estimated properties of (most likely)
inadequately specified statistical models (see Hoover, 2009, for a similar discussion).
It is worth noting that correlation is a measure of dependence, but the two notions do
not necessarily coincide. In particular, if two variables are uncorrelated, this does imply
that they are independent. However, there are special cases where this is true. For instance,
if the probability distribution is Gaussian, the statistical model shows a bi-implication
between zero correlation and independence.
Statistical information depends on two aspects: (1) the statistical model in which it
is framed and (2) the specific hypotheses about the DGP made in the statistical
model. The DGP can also be interpreted as a stochastic mechanism. However, it is
important to notice that the statistical model postulates a stochastic mechanism, but
does not describe it in full detail: it only assumes that the postulated mechanism is
able to generate chance regularity phenomena, of which the observed data are a
representative sample. This point of view of the statistical modeller is appropriately
described by Lindley (2000, p. 295):
[ . . . ] it is only the manipulation of uncertainty that interests us. We are not concerned with the
matter that is uncertain. Thus we do not study the mechanism of rain; only whether it will rain.
3.2 Causal information
Causal information goes beyond mere association and in this sense opens the ‘black box’
of the DGP a step further by providing more details about such mechanisms. Causal
information is ‘augmented’ statistical information: it allows additional interpretation so
that an association between, say, two variables X and Y can be viewed as, for example, a
causal influence from X to Y. But the causal influence may remain stochastic, either
because we do not know the exact value of additional variables further influencing Y,7 or
because the influence of X on Y may be inherently probabilistic. The additional
interpretation making statistical information causal comes from extra-statistical
assumptions which, as we have seen, rely on different kinds of ‘background knowledge’,
for instance theoretical knowledge, information about institutional mechanisms, or views
on the nature of causality (e.g. temporal priority of cause) and its relations with the notion
of statistical dependence.
Before addressing the issue about the conditions under which causal interpretation is
guaranteed (see also next section), it is important to clarify the extent to which causal
information is shaped by statistical information and background knowledge. Statistical
information provides the formalised empirical evidence which can be used to test
hypotheses about causal claims. In the next section we will suggest that statistical evidence
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codifies evidence of difference-making, namely that there is an appropriate difference-
making relation between the putative cause and the putative effect. However, not all
hypotheses can be tested. Background knowledge provides the a priori constraints on this
information: some causal relations are excluded or allowed on the basis of that.
For example, in studying the influences of consumption decisions of families, one
may decide to consider the disposable income as exogenous to this decision, relying
on occasional observations of families or economic theory of consumption behaviour.
In this way, background knowledge a priori excludes (arbitrarily or not) that
household expenditures do not cause household income and that the latter causes the
former, which explains their statistical dependence. In other contexts, background
knowledge may take a completely different form, and be formalised as ‘rules of
inference’, i.e. assumptions on the relation between causal properties and conditional
independence relations.
Suppose we know all the possible conditional independence relations between three
random variables X, Y, and W, and in particular we know that X and Y are not statistically
independent, that Y andW are not statistically independent, but that X is independent ofW
given Y, in symbols X WjY . According to two rules of inference on which several
graphical methods for causal inference are based,8 since Y ‘screens off’ X from W, some
causal structures are excluded and others are allowed. In graphical representations, the
excluded structures are: X! Y ˆW and any structure in which X and W are directly
connected. The allowed structures are: X! Y !W , Xˆ Y ˆW or Xˆ Y !W .
We now turn to the second question. Does the dependence of causal information on
statistical information and background knowledge lead to circularity? One could in fact
argue that statistical information and background knowledge depend, in turn, on causal
information. Statistical information, being framed within a statistical model, depends on
the postulation of a DGP. We have seen that, at the stage of building a statistical model,
extra-statistical background information may play some role, but this is non-causal
knowledge, and even if it is causal, it does not relate to the possible causal relationships
among the objects under scrutiny. Moreover, the mechanisms operating in DGP have not
actually been uncovered: what counts are the concomitant variations of the events. Thus,
statistical information in an associational model is actually not dependent on causal
information.
On the contrary, background knowledge does depend, to a certain extent, on causal
information and so the peril of having hidden causal assumptions (about the sought causal
relations) in the background knowledge used is real. This circularity is avoided by
carefully choosing the ‘parts’ of background knowledge that we are entitled to use.
Specific assumptions about the causal relations under study should be explicitly excluded.
For example, if we are trying to understand whether some household expenditures may
influence future household income (some expenditures on housing and durable goods may
be seen as partial forms of investment and generate future income), we should not build a
statistical model in which income is an exogenous variable.
But this triggers another important and related question: how much background
knowledge is really needed to get new causal information? In the methodology of applied
research, such as econometrics, this is quite a debated question. In the literature, different
answers have been given, and they paved the way to different traditions (see Moneta,
2007). In particular, ‘inductivist’ approaches seek to minimise the use of background
knowledge, while ‘deductivist’ approaches eschew statistical information as a tool of
causal discovery and rely only on theoretical knowledge for the articulation of a causal
structure (i.e. economic theory provides all the background knowledge needed). These two
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approaches, may, quite clearly, lead to two tendencies: inductivist approaches are at risk of
not being able to make the ‘big leap’ beyond statistical information, while deductivist
approaches run the risk of being stuck in a vicious circle.
Our answer about the amount of background knowledge we need is: it depends.
There are situations where we have at our disposal a large volume of data, which may
allow us to infer a very detailed picture of the statistical dependencies (through
conditional independence tests); also, in case we can safely assume that the DGP is
stable, only a relatively limited set of extra assumptions and rules of inference may
suffice (as those proposed by Pearl (2000); Spirtes et al. (2000)). In other situations,
however, the accuracy of background extra-statistical knowledge and the lack of
reliable statistical information may suggest that we need to make extensive use of
background knowledge.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, causal models rely on a hypothetico-deductive
methodology. This view offers also a natural middle way between deductivist and
inductivist approaches, which has to be established in practice in each real-world case.
4. Causal modelling and evidence
As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper we tackle the question of the causal
interpretation of statistical models, and we frame the discussion specifically in the case of
econometrics. The arguments given above hinge upon methodological considerations
about the kind of assumptions, the amount of background knowledge needed and the
methodology used in order to make the step from an associational model towards a causal
model. We argued that, in a statistical model, we infer associations (or dependencies)
between variables, while a causal model is an ‘augmented’ statistical model, ‘augmented’
in such a way that we can infer causal relations. In this section, we discuss that part of the
augmentation having to do with the evidence generated in the associational model and in
the causal model, notably evidence of difference-making and mechanisms. We try to build
a bridge between the recent literature in the philosophy of medicine – where ‘evidential
pluralism’ is currently being debated – and causal modelling in econometrics.
4.1 Evidential pluralism
The remote origins of evidential pluralism lie in the philosophical literature on causation
developed in the second half of the twentieth century. The accounts developed in that
period clustered around two main ideas.
On the one hand, in ‘difference-making accounts’, the claim ‘A causes B’ is established
in virtue of there being some appropriate difference-making relation (probabilistic,
counterfactual or manipulation) between A and B (see, for instance, Arntzenius, 2010;
Eells, 1991; Lewis, [1973] 1986, 2004; Reichenbach, 1956; Suppes, 1970). For instance,
the causal claim ‘Smoking causes lung cancer’ is established, depending on the particular
difference-making account embraced: (1) if smoking increases the chances of developing
lung cancer or (2) if, had smoking rates decreased, cancer rates would have decreased too
or (3) if intervening on smoking behaviour would result in decreased cancer rates.
On the other hand, in ‘mechanistic accounts’ the claim ‘A causes B’ means that there is
a mechanism, or a process, linking the cause to the effect (see, for instance, Bechtel &
Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; Dowe, 2000; Glennan, 2002, 2010; Machamer, Darden,
& Craver, 2000; Salmon, 1984). For instance, the causal claim ‘Smoking causes lung
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cancer’ is established to the extent that there is a sufficiently well understood mechanism
that links smoking to lung cancer.
In a recent paper, Russo and Williamson (2007) develop an argument to show that
there is a share of problems in holding one, the other or some combination of the above-
mentioned views. The mistake, in each of the above-mentioned accounts, is to reduce the
concept of causation to either the concept of mechanism or to (an appropriate form of)
difference-making. Russo and Williamson (2007) go on in arguing that the main problem
is the confusion between the very concept of causation and the evidence needed in order
to establish a causal claim. Causal claims, in their view, are established on the basis of
evidence of mechanisms and difference-making. They illustrate this thesis about
evidential pluralism in the field of biomedical research, appealing to current practices in,
e.g., the International Agency for Research on Cancer and to several examples from
history of medicine.9
This form of evidential pluralism, now referred to as the ‘Russo–Williamson Thesis’
(RWT), generated a substantial body of literature in the context of medicine (see, for
instance, Clarke, Gillies, Illari, Russo, & Williamson, 2013; Illari, 2011; La Caze, 2011;
Russo & Williamson, 2011; Weber, 2009), but much less in the context of the social
sciences and in particular econometrics. In the following, we discuss how different
evidential components are generated in the associational and causal models presented in
the previous sections and how they support the inferences drawn in associational and
causal models.
4.2 Types of evidence and types of model
According to RWT, causal claims need support from two types of evidence, broadly
conceived. One type is evidence of difference-making, that is probabilistic, statistical or
counterfactual relations between variables of interest indicating that the putative causal
factor is in fact relevant (or, makes a difference) to the occurrence of the putative effect.
Difference-making evidence is generated, in a first instance, by the statistical information
– in the form of dependencies – of associational models (see earlier Section 3.1).
Difference-making is needed to justify the choice of building the ‘augmented’ statistical
model discussed earlier in Sections 2 and 3. Difference-making evidence also supports
claims about prediction and control derived from the causal claims established in the
model.
The other type of evidence is evidence of mechanisms, that is knowledge – whether
plausible or confirmed – about mechanisms that (may) underlie the observed
dependencies. The issue of whether there are socio-economic mechanisms as opposed
to individual-level mechanisms is not easy to settle (for a discussion see Little, 2006). An
important part of the recent debates in social science methodology has been focussed on
the characterisation and modelling of socio-economic mechanisms (see, for instance,
Demeulenaere, 2011). In this literature, socio-economic mechanisms are not just the
statistical aggregate (e.g. sum or average) of individual mechanisms, but may also display
properties not reducible to the micro-level.
According to the econometric tradition which can be traced back to the Cowles
commission, (economic) theory provides the mechanisms, and empirical research is
eventually about testing the theory against available data (cf. Boumans, 2010). But we can
also conceive of causal modelling as the modelling enterprise that we use to hypothesise
and test (economic or social) mechanisms (see, for instance, Mouchart & Russo, 2011;
Mouchart, Russo, & Wunsch, 2010; Russo, 2011b). In this view, the ‘augmented’
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statistical model codifies the available background knowledge and preliminary analysis of
data in the ‘recursive decomposition’. The recursive decomposition (a generalisation of
the marginal-conditional decomposition mentioned in Section 2.2) breaks down the initial
joint probability distribution into a sequence of marginal and conditional components that
can be interpreted as a mechanism. The important feature of causal mechanisms, in this
perspective, is that they carry explanatory power.
What RWT says is that, alone, neither evidence of difference-making nor evidence of
mechanisms suffices to establish causal relations. This is typically the case in
econometrics too, as we seek to establish dependencies (in associational models), and
we also impose further constraints (the augmentation) in order to draw causal inferences.
Mechanisms play an important role in the augmentation phase. This, notice, does not
amount to saying that difference-making and mechanisms are necessary (or sufficient)
conditions for causal relations. The thesis has epistemological and methodological scope.
This means that RWT indicates what to look for in order to establish causal relations,
i.e. what kind of evidence licences claims about dependency and what kind of evidence
licences claims about causality.
Differently put, RWT is not a tick-list for items of evidence such that, if we have them,
we are automatically allowed to interpret the model causally. Evidential pluralism refers to
the way evidence generated in a model has to be evaluated. What we seek to evaluate is
whether statistical and causal information allow us to establish that the putative causal
factors make a difference to the effect, and that there is some mechanism that supports
such difference-making relations. Thus, one single item can be evidence of both
difference-making and mechanism. Examples from medicine are perhaps clearer in this
respect. For instance, observations about the mode of transmission of a bacterium, say
Vibrio Cholerae, provide evidence about the mechanism underlying such transmission
and that the bacterium makes a difference to the occurrence of the disease.
In socio-economic contexts we are most often provided with evidence of difference-
making generated by associational models, and the real challenge is to use or model causal
information such that evidence of mechanisms supports causal inferences. One difficulty is
that in socio-economic contexts, very different mechanisms can support the same
difference-making relations. Population heterogeneity is a real problem for social research
and it is an empirical question how much (and to what extent) the same mechanisms are at
work in different contexts. Mechanisms are often highly context-dependent, but this does
not mean they are of no use. Quite to the contrary, it is of utmost importance, when
building the causal model, to be explicit about the assumptions and background
knowledge employed during the various phases of building, testing and interpreting a
model. This, as we shall discuss later, is crucial in conflict resolution, that is, when we have
radically different explanations for the same phenomenon.
4.3 Some consequences of evidential pluralism
In this section we show that evidential pluralism is able to shed new light on three broad
issues concerning causal modelling: model-dependence, fallibility and conflict resolution.
4.3.1 Model-dependence
A main consequence of evidential pluralism is that the validity of causal claims is relative
to their respective models. This does not amount to denying the reality of socio-economic
phenomena. It is instead a way of highlighting the importance of each stage and part of the
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modelling enterprise: assumptions, statistical and causal information, background
knowledge, data analysis and testing. In other words, results of empirical studies are
primarily valid within the model being developed, and each stage of the modelling
procedure contributes to establishing the validity of the model.10
We mentioned in Section 2 studies on household consumption. A well-established
empirical regularity is the so-called Engel’s law: the poorer is a family, the larger its
budget share spent on nourishment (cf. Chai &Moneta, 2010, and references therein). This
is indeed a well-known empirical generalisation, grounded on the numerous investigations
which have applied statistical modelling to a wide range of data-sets and have found this
form of statistical dependence between food budget share and income. As mentioned, the
standard approach (in neoclassical economics) is to causally augment this statistical
information and to embed it in a theoretical model which contemplates utility
maximisation and rational choice. Other, more naturalistic, approaches provide
alternative interpretations of that statistical dependence by pointing out at the hierarchical
structure of individual needs, physiological wants, such as those motivating food
consumption, have to be (to a certain degree) satisfied before devoting resources to
consumption activities aimed at the satisfaction of other (e.g. psychological or cognitive)
needs (Chai & Moneta, 2012; Witt, 2001).
However, such claims will be valid within the corresponding model being developed,
namely depending on the analysed data, on the background knowledge of the researchers
and on the methods used. It is an empirical question whether the same results are valid for
different data-sets (namely for different populations) and whether different modelling
strategies lead to different results, in which case it is of utmost importance to find out
why.11 Regarding food consumption, for example, it is interesting to note that Banerjee
and Duflo (2011) found out that in Morocco families that do not have enough to eat buy a
television and they analysed this phenomenon on the basis of an adequate and evidence-
based understanding of poverty.
In summary, the ‘augmentation’ of statistical evidence (associations) in causal terms is
an interpretation of real aspects of the reality against the backdrop of our background
knowledge. Often, background knowledge is formalised (as in neoclassical economics) in
terms of an analytical model, sometimes articulated in substantial information related to
different scientific areas. This is expressed in a language familiar to econometricians and
basically rephrases what we expressed earlier, in a language that is more familiar to
philosophers: there is an interplay and mutual support of evidence of difference-making
(the dependencies) and mechanisms (e.g. economic behaviour).
But causal claims in social research can be model-dependent in another, less direct, way.
Statistical, or difference-making, evidence, on which associational models and causal
models are based, is relative to the statistical model because it is generated within this frame.
This simple fact renders causal claims (when inferred in the framework of an augmented
statistical model) model-dependent. The fact that statistical evidence is relative to (or makes
senses in) the statistical model where it has been generated has sometimes been neglected. In
fact, data are often viewed as if they were already statistical evidence per se. But this view is
not correct. Data are but a sample of an unobserved or hypothetical DGP, so it cannot be
‘evidence’. Data analysis, in an associational model, provides evidence of difference-
making. This neglect is apparent in empirical works (in economics or social research more
generally) in which correlations or linear regression functions, which involve precise
assumptions about the DGP, are estimated before testing any feature of the DGP. The
consequence is that one may obtain bad sample estimates of population values parameters.
This point has been clearly made already by Spanos (1990) and also by Hoover (2009).
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4.3.2 Fallibility
We talk about fallibility in two senses. The first is that the results of empirical studies
should be always considered fallible and open to revision, once a more reliable
background knowledge or new data becomes available, or once different modelling
strategies are tried out. Evidence is neither monolithic nor immutable, and we have to
allow for the possibility of revising the results of studies on the basis of new evidence
generated. We said earlier that background knowledge plays a crucial role in the
‘augmentation’ of statistical models. But this does not mean that background knowledge
cannot be changed. There is instead a va et vient between established knowledge and
knowledge being established, and the evidence generated in empirical studies of course
looms large in this dynamic.
The second is that the statistical evidence (i.e. difference-making evidence encoded in
the dependencies of the associational model) upon which causal claims are based should
also be considered fallible and open to revision. This is related to the earlier point about
model-dependence. It is always conceivable that a more appropriate formalisation of the
DGP (perhaps due to progress in statistical methods or data collection) delivers a more
accurate statistical model and hence more reliable statistical evidence.
The acknowledgement of fallibility reinforces the point about model-dependence in
the sense that, precisely because we can get things wrong, it is of utmost importance to
specify how we got to those results. However, this is not to undermine the possibility of
drawing causal conclusions from models in social research.
4.3.3 Conflict resolution
The views about evidential pluralism and model-dependence, we maintain, also help with
conflict resolution. A major gain in adopting the framework we suggested – notably, the
account of associational versus causal models, evidential pluralism and model-
dependence – allows a better and more fruitful analysis of conflict resolutions,
i.e. when scientists disagree about causal relations. Disagreements may in fact come from
different ways of specifying the model (that is different difference-making evidence) or
from different pieces of information in the augmentation (that is different mechanisms to
support dependencies). Thus, specifying how difference-making evidence has been
generated or what (socio-economic) mechanisms have been called to support
dependencies may help understand the origin of divergent results. This is not guarantee
that a solution will be found, but at least helps to make clear where the dispute lies.
Consider, for instance, the dispute in the 1980s between Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz, on the one hand, and David Hendry and Neil Ericsson, on the other hand, on
money demand in the UK (Friedman & Schwartz, 1982, 1991; Hendry & Ericsson, 1985,
1991)12. In their 1982 book, Monetary Trends in the United States and the United
Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867–1975, Friedman and
Schwartz present a number of empirical findings which support several economic
hypotheses consistent with the quantity theory of money, according to which the money
stock is the predominant factor explaining changes in money income. Hendry and Ericsson
(1985) examined their empirical claims about monetary behaviour in the UK and found
that these were established upon an econometric model which was not adequately
specified.
In the regressions that Friedman and Schwartz (1982) estimated to establish evidence
concerning the money demand, and the influence of money on income and prices in UK,
they used phase-averaged data, considered the parameters in the money demand equation
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as constant, treated money as exogenous and, more in general, ignored the mutual
interdependence of money, income and prices, and interest rates. Hendry and Ericsson
(1985) showed that these assumptions can be tested from the data (or at least have testable
implications). Using the same UK data used by Friedman and Schwartz, Hendry and
Ericsson rejected those assumptions, removing credibility from the theoretical conclusions
of Friedman and Schwartz (1982). Moreover, they estimated a better-fitting, constant,
dynamic error-correction (i.e. taking into account co-integrating relationships) model.
This model turns out to be a model of money but not of prices because ‘its constancy holds
only conditionally on contemporaneous prices’ (Hendry & Ericsson, 1991).
Two remarks are in order. First, questioning the results means to discuss different
aspects of the model building and model testing process (methodology, assumptions,
background knowledge). To ground both the claim that Friedman and Schwartz’s model
was mis-specified and the proposal of an alternative empirical model of money demand,
Hendry and Ericsson (1991) discuss at length the methodology of model specification. In a
manner consistent with Spanos’ (and ours, see Section 2.2) perspective, Hendry and
Ericsson (1991) see the statistical model as a DGP ‘characterized by the joint density of
the observable variables’. Empirical (econometric) models are just transformation or
‘reduction’ of the DGP and each step of reduction should be tested vis-a`-vis the data
(Cook & Hendry, 1994). For example, one of the implicit (or hidden) assumptions in
Friedman and Schwartz’s analysis is that disturbances are normal. Using a standard test,
Hendry and Ericsson (1985) show that normality should be rejected. Friedman and
Schwartz, on the other hand, use statistical analysis to find associations which have to be
heavily interpreted by a priori historical knowledge about institutional arrangements and
mechanisms (cf. Friedman & Schwartz, 1991).
The second remark we want to make is about fallibilism: in the light of new methods of
analysis (or data collection) we can revise established results. If econometrics, since the
time Hendry and Ericsson wrote, offers new tools, then it is a sensible thing to rerun the
analysis and check whether the same results obtain. In a recent paper, indeed, Ericsson
(2011) re-evaluates Hendry and Ericsson’s (1985, 1991) model with Autometrics, which is
an algorithm for computer-automated model selection (cf. Doornik, 2009), finding ground
for several (minor) improvements.
It is worth noting, however, that this does not licence an ‘anything goes’ line of
argument. If background knowledge is used in different manners and if there are
competitive specifications of the statistical model, one should always question which
alternative is better justified. These questions are not settled a priori. They are instead
settled by an open and honest discussion about the choices made at each step of the
modelling procedure. So we are in the position, at least in principle, to settle conflicts. It is
also worth noting that this is no guarantee that conflicts will be resolved, as we may not
reach a consensus about what background or testing technique to use. But surely open and
honest confrontation at the level of the model should lead the debate forward, and thereby
enhance our understanding of phenomena.
5. Conclusion
Econometrics, and the social sciences more generally, makes extensive use of statistical
models in order to gain causal knowledge of phenomena. While early statisticians and
methodologists such as Wright (in the 1930s) or Blalock (in the 1960s) were more prone to
adopt a causal interpretation of statistical models, present-day scientists (and philosophers
of science alike) are cautious in drawing causal conclusions from statistics. We also share
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this cautious attitude, and yet we think that the question of when a statistical model can be
given a causal interpretation needs to be addressed further.
The paper advances the view that we are justified in interpreting a statistical model in
causal terms when it is ‘augmented’ with some specific features. We developed two lines
of arguments. The first draws a distinction between associational models and causal
models (and thereby between statistical and causal information); the second examines
evidential pluralism in the context of econometric modelling.
Associational models are statistical models that allow us to infer dependencies
between variables of interest. They are based on a minor use of background knowledge
and assumptions. In order to infer causal relations, we need to augment associational
models with a lot more background knowledge and assumptions, and to employ a
hypothetico-deductive methodology. An important difference between associational
models and causal models is that they encode, respectively, statistical and causal
information.
Both statistical and causal information describe some facets of the DGP which realises
the values of certain variables of interest. At bottom, the difference between statistical and
causal information is that the former consists of symmetric relations (X is associated with
Y implies that Y is associated with X), whereas the latter consists of asymmetric relations
(X causes Y does not imply that Y causes X). While statistical information describes how
these values are regularly associated, or how the values regularly co-vary, causal
information contributes to a description of the DGP as a ‘mechanism’. Statistical and
causal information thus contribute to making successful inferences about intervention,
explanation and prediction.
We addressed the question of why causal information does not necessarily introduce a
vicious circle. Causal information is statistical information augmented with background
knowledge, namely assumptions about some facets of the DGP which also include causal
propositions. Vicious circles are excluded if assumptions about causal propositions we
want to validate are deliberately not included in this augmentation.
We then considered the recent literature on evidential pluralism, namely the thesis that
causal claims are established on the basis of a plurality of evidential sources. The thesis
has not received close attention in social contexts, particularly in econometrics. We argued
that associational models generate evidence of difference-making, which is encoded in the
dependencies inferred within such framework. Causal models also generate evidence of
mechanisms, which is encoded in the formalisation of the DGPs.
Ultimately, we hold the view that a causal interpretation of statistical models is
justified to the extent that statistical information is augmented into causal information, or
in other words that evidence of difference-making is integrated with evidence of
mechanisms.
We discussed three consequences of adopting such a view: model-dependence,
fallibility and conflict resolution. These are all consequences of highlighting the
importance of the modelling procedure, and of each step therein, for establishing causal
relations. However, model-dependence does not imply that no generalisation about
economic (or social) phenomena can be attained. It just says that it is an empirical question
whether, and to what extent, we can generalise. Similarly, reminding about the fallibility
of studies is not to undermine causal analysis at its very basis. It just says that our
knowledge and understanding of economic (or social) phenomena is not immutable, and
that it is precisely through further empirical studies that we can improve it. But this may
mean to discard previous results. Finally, conflict resolution is a delicate issue, and we
wanted to suggest that honest and open discussions about any stage of the modelling
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procedure (from data collection to testing and interpretation) may shed light on divergent
conclusions.
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Notes
1. On the interpretation of associational models and of causal models in terms of ‘variation’ rather
than ‘regularity’, see Russo (2009b).
2. Since Xi; Yi;Wi are i.i.d., we omit for convenience the subscript i. Notice that in this case
f ðX1; . . . ;Xn;fÞ ¼
Qn
i¼1 f ðXi; uÞ.
3. We thank one anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
4. The correlation is indeed a measure of dependence between two normal variates, and is defined
in the following way: rðX; YÞ ¼ sXY=sX ;sY , where sXY denotes the covariance between X
and Y; and sX , sY are standard deviations. The partial correlation can be recursively defined
as: rðX; YjWÞ ¼ ðrðX; YÞ2 rðX;WÞrðY;WÞÞ=ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ12 r 2ðX;WÞ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ12 r 2ðY ;WÞp Þ. Statistical
dependence, denoted by (Dawid, 1979), is defined as: X Y iff f XY ðx; yÞ ¼ f XðxÞf Y ðyÞ.
Conditioning onW : X YjW iff f XY jW ðx; yjwÞ ¼ f XjW ðxjwÞf YjW ðyjwÞ. More details are given in
Section 3.1.
5. Or, rephrased in ‘variation’ terms alluded above, stochastic co-variations that are regular
enough in the data-set.
6. The stochastic characteristic of the social phenomena is related to our incomplete knowledge of
the world. This does not force us to take a stance about the metaphysical issue of whether the
world is deterministic or indeterministic. In the framework hereby developed, we can
meaningfully talk of stochastic social mechanism without any commitment to indeterminism.
7. In this way the ‘black box’ of the DGP is only partially opened.
8. That is, the causal Markov and the faithfulness condition (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 2000).
9. Russo and Williamson (2007) argue, together with the thesis about evidential pluralism, in
favour of the ‘epistemic theory’, which is supposed to provide the causal metaphysics. Simply
put, according to the epistemic theory, causation has to do with the (causal) inferences we are
allowed to make on the basis of the available evidence, background knowledge and methods.
Causation, in this theory, is primarily an epistemic category that we, as epistemic agents, use to
chart the world in order to make successful inferences. The epistemic theory has also sparked
debate, but we do not take stance with respect to this discussion here. Evidential pluralism is in
fact compatible with other pluralistic, metaphysical views.
10. On this point, see also Russo (2011a).
11. Some readers may prefer the expression ‘context-dependent’ on the grounds that it is more
general in scope than ‘model-dependent’. We do not have any objection to that. In our
approach, the context is part of the model and consequently there is not any incompatibility
between the two.
12. For a discussion see Hammond (1996) and references therein.
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